UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

5-25-2021

State v. McMurty Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48333

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported

Recommended Citation
"State v. McMurty Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48333" (2021). Not Reported. 7084.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7084

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

Electronically Filed
5/25/2021 3:24 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
COLLEEN D. ZAHN
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division
KACEY L. JONES
Deputy Attorney General
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
APRILLYN MICHELLE McMURTRY,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 48333-2020
Ada County Case No.
CR01-18-60249

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

ISSUES
1.
Has McMurtry failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion when
it imposed a sentence of ten years with three years fixed following her plea of guilty to felony
driving under the influence?
2.
Has McMurtry failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by denying her
Rule 35 motion for reduction of her sentence?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Law enforcement responded to a collision after McMurtry’s vehicle rear-ended a truck.
(PSI, p.178.) Passengers in the truck told law enforcement that McMurtry’s vehicle had struck a
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sign near the interstate prior to the collision. (PSI, p.178.) McMurtry admitted she rear-ended the
truck but claimed it stopped abruptly in her lane; she denied striking the sign. (PSI, p.178.) She
had trouble retrieving her driver’s license and maintaining balance. (PSI, p.178.) While speaking
to an officer, McMurtry stumbled and the officer had to grab her to keep her from falling. (PSI,
p.178.) McMurtry’s driver’s license showed as suspended out of California. (PSI, p.178.) She
admitted she had been drinking and provided breath samples of .209/.214. (PSI, p.178.)
The state charged McMurtry with felony driving under the influence (DUI). (R., p.18.)
McMurtry pleaded guilty. (R., p.26.) The district court sentenced McMurtry to ten years with
three years fixed. (R., pp.41-43; Tr., p.31, Ls.17-23.) McMurtry filed a Rule 35 motion for
reduction of her sentence. (R., pp.45-102.) The district court denied the motion. (R., pp.103-05.)
Approximately nine months later, the district court granted McMurtry limited post-conviction
relief and re-entered its order denying the Rule 35 motion “solely to reopen the respective appeal
periods.” (R., pp.107-09; Aug., p.1.) McMurtry timely filed a notice of appeal from the district
court’s re-entered order. (R., pp.113-14.)
ARGUMENT
I.
McMurtry Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
McMurtry asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it sentenced her to ten

years with three years fixed. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-8.) McMurtry has shown no abuse of
discretion. The sentence imposed is reasonable in light of her history of DUIs and the facts of the
underlying case.
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B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
159 P.3d 838 (2007)). Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden
of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d
614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). In evaluating
whether a lower court abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which
asks “whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within
the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to
the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” State
v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 272, 429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163
Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).
C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Sentencing Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v. Farwell, 144
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining whether the appellant met this burden,
the court considers the entire sentence but presumes that the determinate portion will be the period
of actual incarceration. State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017) (citing
Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391). To establish that the sentence was excessive, the
appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate
to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.
Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. “‘In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not
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substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.’” State v.
Matthews, 164 Idaho 605, 608, 434 P.3d 209, 212 (2018) (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho
139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008)).
The sentence imposed is reasonable in light of McMurtry’s criminal history. Her criminal
history includes at least five prior misdemeanor DUIs and at least two prior felony DUIs. (PSI,
pp.179-81.) In addition, McMurtry has two DUI convictions out of Montana that were not
reflected on the PSI. (See Tr., p.6, L.9 – p.9, L.20.) As the PSI noted, all of McMurtry’s criminal
history is related to alcohol or driving. (PSI, p.181.)
The sentence is also reasonable in light of the facts underlying the case. McMurtry was
driving while her license was suspended and while she was under the influence of alcohol. (PSI,
p.178.) McMurtry struck a road sign before rear-ending another vehicle. (PSI, p.178.) She had
trouble finding her identification and an officer had to grab McMurtry to prevent her from falling.
(PSI, p.178.) Her BAC was over .2—roughly three times the legal limit. (PSI, p.178.)
The district court reasonably concluded the sentence was necessary to achieve the
objectives of criminal sentencing. Incarceration was necessary to protect society in light of
McMurtry’s criminal history, her BAC in this case, and the fact that she had two collisions—
striking a sign and later another vehicle. (Tr., p.29, Ls.12-17.) The district court concluded
McMurtry “present[s] a danger to the community that I cannot have.” (Tr., p.31, Ls.2-4.)
McMurtry’s history of DUIs, many of which undoubtedly occurred while she was on probation
for a prior DUI, demonstrates that “the threat of incarceration has had no deterrent effect on
[McMurtry’s] behavior.” (Tr., p.30, Ls.1-17.) The district court also noted that rehabilitation is a
“great goal” and McMurtry “had many opportunities to access that” but it “has not worked.” (Tr.,
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p.31, Ls.4-7.) The district court determined that punishment was an important consideration after
McMurtry’s numerous DUIs. (Tr., p.31, Ls.7-9.) As the PSI opined:
The sincerity of Ms. McMurtry is not in question. However, her history of
continued drinking and driving cannot be minimized. She again made a poor
decision to drive a vehicle while intoxicated, and once again placed herself and the
community at risk. It appears that previously imposed sanctions have failed to
satisfy the goals of deterrence and rehabilitation. This time Ms. McMurtry’s
actions have impacted others due to the vehicle accident she caused. It appears Ms.
McMurtry would benefit from participation in rehabilitative programs during a
period of penal incarceration.
(PSI, pp.190-91.) The district court did not abuse its discretion when it followed the PSI’s
recommendation and imposed a sentence of ten years with three years fixed.
McMurtry argues that the sentence is excessive in light of the mitigating factors, such as
her family circumstances, employment, and genuine efforts to address her alcohol abuse. However
the district court recognized and praised McMurtry’s efforts. (See Tr., p.29, Ls.1-4, 17-25.) The
PSI noted that McMurtry performed well on pretrial supervision, maintained communication with
pretrial services, had all negative UAs, maintained full-time employment, participated in
outpatient treatment, and attended AA meetings. (PSI, p.181.) It also documented the details of
McMurtry’s life, her remorse, and the numerous letters of support on her behalf. (See PSI, pp.18288, 205-13.) At sentencing, the state, McMurtry’s counsel, and McMurtry herself reiterated the
mitigating circumstances. (See Tr., p.13, Ls.12-23; p.17, L.13 – p.24, L.24; p.26, L.10 – p.28,
L.13.) The district court reasonably concluded that the sentence imposed would provide McMurtry
with rehabilitative options while also protecting society, in light of the mitigating and aggravating
circumstances. McMurtry has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion.
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II.
McMurtry Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied
Her Rule 35 Motion For Reduction Of Sentence
A.

Introduction
McMurtry asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her Rule 35

motion for reduction of sentence. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-8.) McMurtry has shown no abuse of
discretion. McMurtry’s motion was based on information presented to the district court before
sentencing and her progress during incarceration. The district court did not abuse its discretion
when it considered that information and determined that it did not render the otherwise-reasonable
sentence excessive.
B.

Standard Of Review
“A motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for leniency,

addressed to the sound discretion of the court.” State v. Anderson, 163 Idaho 513, 517, 415 P.3d
381, 385 (Ct. App. 2015). Where a sentence is neither illegal nor excessive when pronounced,
“the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information
subsequently provided to the district court in support of the motion.” State v. Burggraf, 160 Idaho
177, 180, 369 P.3d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 2016) (citing Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203, 159 P.3d at 840).
“An appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the
underlying sentence absent the presentation of new information.” Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203, 159
P.3d at 840.
C.

McMurtry Failed To Show Her Sentence Was Excessive In Light Of New Information
McMurtry filed a lengthy Rule 35 motion in which she requested the district court reduce

her sentence based on her criminal history, her past unhealthy marriage, that she was sober for five
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months prior to this DUI, she relapsed after a call from her estranged father, she sought treatment
after her arrest, she performed well on pretrial release, she is dedicated to sobriety, has completed
treatment since being incarcerated, and has put together a parole plan. (See R., pp.45-102.) Most
of this information was presented to the district court prior to sentencing, and therefore does not
constitute new information. (See PSI, pp.179-88, 205-13, 339-41, 361-79.) The remaining
information relates to McMurtry’s positive performance and progress in prison. The district court
is not required to grant leniency based on good behavior in prison, which is, after all, the
expectation. See State v. Cobler, 148 Idaho 769, 773, 229 P.3d 374, 378 (2010); State v.
Copenhaver, 129 Idaho 494, 496, 927 P.2d 884, 886 (1996) (“The district court further did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to view Copenhaver’s good behavior in prison between his
sentencing and the Rule 35 hearing as a mitigating factor.”). Although the district court was
“encouraged by any progress and positive conduct [McMurtry] has made or shown through her
actions while incarcerated,” the district court concluded that progress “does not diminish the
impact of [McMurtry]’s actions, or the Court’s reasoning for imposing the original sentence.” (R.,
pp.104-05.) McMurtry has failed to show any abuse of the district court’s discretion.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 25th day of May, 2021.

/s/ Kacey L. Jones
KACEY L. JONES
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 25th day of May, 2021, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

KLJ/dd

/s/ Kacey L. Jones
KACEY L. JONES
Deputy Attorney General
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